Abstract

 

David Hume’s analysis of induction establishes that inferences from past to future cannot be justified either deductively or without circular appeal to past experience. While the logic underpinning this view is widely accepted, he further asserts that should the course of nature change, past experience would lack rational relevance. This paper challenges the latter conclusion through analysis of a memorable thought experiment articulated by ‘Abdu’l-Bahá in dialogue with Henri Bergson. The argument advanced here is that experience, when sufficiently warranted, can impose enduring constraints on rational explanation even in the absence of demonstrative certainty. A single observation need not justify a universal generalisation in order to retain epistemic force; it need only disclose a feature that cannot be coherently excluded without compensating explanation. By distinguishing logical justification from epistemic relevance, the analysis argues that experience limits what may be rationally affirmed or denied, thereby preserving the rational standing of scientific and philosophical inquiry under conditions of uncertainty. The argument is deliberately minimal but structurally sufficient: it does not establish what must be the case, but restricts what can be coherently denied.

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